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ABTSRACT 
STRA TJ-I:'rtui?E Utv .. Tvr.i:: .. si .. ·j :, i 
.. ,i/1 LIBRA R ·sr j 
SPECIAL C_DLI-ECTfON~ ' 
The value of a firm is an important indication of the financial performance of any company, more 
so to current and potential investors .. Firm value is affected by various factors, this study singles 
out three factors as the independent variables; leverage, cost of capital and agency costs, as to what 
extent these factors affect firm value .. The study population was of 46 non-financial listed 
companies in Kenya; only 22 companies are on focus in the study as they met the criteria of a 
balanced panel data approach. A sectoral approach is taken in the study, as the 22 companies are 
analyzed in their various sector category for a 5-year period (20 13-20 17) .. The regression results 
showed that all the independent variables, including the moderating variable of size were highly 
significant to firm value with a p value of 0.00 each .. Leverage and cost of capital resulted in 
positive significance while agency cost and size resulted in negative significance .. The results 
derived from the answered questionnaires were consistent with the regression results .. The study 
measured firm value using Tobin's Q ratio, the overall mean aggregate of all the companies being 
1 .. 12 and indication that investing in non-financial companies in the NSE is a good investment 
prospect.. The aggregate value of each company in the eight sectors is given .. The firm value was 
computed based on information derived from the company's statements and to act as a guide but 
should not be used in isolation when making investment decisions .. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The main objective of any company is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders as it performs 
its mandate. The wealth of shareholders is maximized through dividends payments and capital 
gains (when investors dispose shares). Firm value has been directly linked to shareholders wealth 
maximization as maximizing the value of a company in turns maximizes the value of the ordinary 
share price. Hence, investors are keen to invest in firms, which show potential for growth and 
higher returns. Both internal and external factors affect the value of a firm. Usually the external 
factors are beyond the control of management hence this study will focus on internal factors, which 
managers can control beforehand, and address ( de Wet , 2006); ( Gharaibeh & Qader, 2017). 
When the wealth of investors is not maximized, there is the risk that investors can pull off their 
capital by selling off their stakes. This can lead to the collapse of a company, as even potential 
investors and other financiers will shy off from investing in a company whose going concern is 
uncertain (Luthfiah & Suherman, 20 18). Adengba et al (20 16) States that firm value is the same 
as market value. This is because firm value can provide a maximum positive return to stakeholders 
if a company's share prices increases. This in turn means the higher the share price, the higher the 
positive return for the shareholders. 
When the operations of a company are running well, its value also rises in line with that and the 
reverse is expected (Luthfiah & Suherman, 20 18) . They are other several common factors, which 
affect a firm's value. Empirical studies by Downs(l991), Sharma and Singh(2006)and 
Sharma(2011) reveals that; dividend policy, earnings per share, firm size, market price of shares, 
profitability, price earnings ratio, dividend payout ratio, capital structure, efficiency, growth, 
corporate governance, and financial performance positively and significantly affect firm value. 
The levels of significance may differ in the different studies and other emerging studies are 
disputing some ofthe stated factors. The conflicting results may be due to; different methodologies 
employed differences in target population, different financial periods, countries, and sectors 
Omollo et al (20 18). This is study seeks to evaluate how firm value is affected by three factors, 
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which are long-term debt, cost of capital, and agency costs. Studies conducted have mainly focused 
on generic aspects and others a specific aspect alone. 
Capital structure is usually expressed with respect to debt, as debt to equity ratio or debt to assets 
ratio (de Wet , 2006). Debt financing is usually viewed as a double-edged sword, as one hand it 
increases the risk of any company, but if proceeds are, well spent high debt ideally leads to higher 
returns for shareholders (Kannadhasan, eta! (2016). Compared to other sources offinance debt is 
usually viewed as being a cheap and usefully aid in improving the return on equity. Debt can be 
useful in taming managers so that they can only select projects, which will give a positive Net 
present value on investments (Jensen & Meckling, (1976); Shah,et a!, (2005); Bhaird & Lucey , 
(2010); Chen & Jiang, (2014); Anyanzwa, 2015). Lasher, (2003) and Correia, eta!, (2006) state 
that high financial gearing can lead to higher earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE), 
however this does not automatically mean shareholders wealth will be maximized. 
When an investor supplies funds to a company, the firm is required to compensate for the 
opportunity cost as the funds would have been used to invest on other investment opportunities 
with the same level of risk. Since an investor has many alternatives to choose from on where to 
put their finances, a firm has to provide a suitable return to compensate for the opportunity cost. 
In finance, that return is known as cost of capital, for a firm to add value to the wealth of 
shareholders it has to gain in excess of its cost of capital. Cost of capital is defined as the minimum 
amount of return expected by company's investors who provide financing to the company. From 
a managerial perspective it acts as a yardstick as to which investment opportunities viable for a 
particular company. It is normally employed as a discounting rate to determine the future net 
present value of future cash flows. It also used as a benchmark for comparing the internal rate of 
return of proposed investment opportunities. If the cost of capital is greater than the internal return, 
a company should reject the proposal. Cost of capital is essential in firm value, as it directly touches 
on how shareholders will be compensated; ( Khadka , 2006); ( Mohamad & Saad, 20 12). 
In the quest to maximize firm value, which should in turn maximize shareholders wealth a conflict 
of interest, tends to arise between managers and shareholders. Asymmetric information fuels this 
conflict, as it assumed that managers know more about the company hence with that knowledge 
act towards benefiting themselves at the expense of maximizing shareholders wealth. These 
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divergent interests between shareholders and managers, leads to agency costs, as dealing with the 
agency problem is an economic loss to the owners. Agency costs are classified as operating 
expenses in the profit and loss statement as any personal action by management usually increases 
operating costs without any offsetting benefit to the shareholders Jensen and Meckling ( 1976); 
Williams ( 1987) ; Nazir, eta! , (20 12). Financiers are constantly faced with the agency problem in 
ensuring that a firm's financial resources is being managed prudently and only spent on income 
generating problems. An increase in a company's agency costs eventually causes a decline in its 
earnings, leading to a decrease of its value (Min,et a!, 2017). Usually shareholders expect higher 
financial compensation when firms take on more risk, hence a proper scrutiny of a firm' agency 
costs could help investors in mitigating agency problems and ensuring firm value remains 
attractive in the foreseeable future. The presumption is that a reduction is agency costs leads to the 
overall increase ofthe firm value (Nazir, eta!, 2012). 
Studies on capital structure and firm value conducted in emerging markets similar to ours show a 
mirage of different results. Ogbulu (2012) study in Nigeria indicates that equity is not a relevant 
factor affecting a firm's value this contradicts the findings in Ghana by Antwi and Mills (2012) 
who state that equity is an important aspect with a postive significant effect. Both studies agree 
that long-term debt significantly and positively affect firm value. Contrary to findings in studies 
by Numes eta!, (2009), Bui, (2017) that show capital structure is significant but has a negative 
effect on firm value. Karuma et a!, (20 18) and Omollo et a! (20 18) both could not come up with 
sustentative conclusions on how capital structure affects firm value. This is because results 
obtained were mixed with some aspects indicating significant positive relationships, others 
negative or no significant relationship. Some studies have resulted to no relationship at all (Seo, 
20 16). While others have concluded that the relationship established is non-significant (Raza, 
(2013); (Chadha & Sharma, 2016). 
For any economy to progress, it is vital to have continuous growth in the corporate sector. Poor 
choices in relation to financing decisions, is stated as one the main reasons why firms in developing 
economies crumble. It is critical for companies, more so those listed in developing countries to 
select a financial structure that will encourage growth and add value to shareholders investment. 
These companies in developing countries play an important role in terms of provision of goods 
and services, offering employment opportunities, income in terms of dividends and capital gains 
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for investors. An individual company usually affects a mirage of different stakeholders hence if 
not well managed financially it leads to a negative ripple effect (Prasad, et al, (200 1 ); Abor, (2008). 
At the beginning of 2016, six companies listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), were 
fighting to stay afloat because of massive accumulation of debt. The six included; Mumias sugar 
company, Kenya Airways, Trans Century, ARM cement, Home Afrika and Uchumi supermarkets. 
These troubled six companies owed more than their ability to pay and investors are facing very 
low prospective in terms of returns. These companies took on debt for growth and expansion with 
the hope that the gains made will be able to repay off the debts and net off positively. 
Unfortunately, the cash generated was not sufficient to settle off their debt obligation. In such 
cases, shareholders suffer the most, as their share prices are diluted, they get negative returns, and 
in most cases, their investments go down the drain repaying off debts and financing recurrent 
expenditures (Juma, 2016). Apart from investors, such downfalls usually mean loss of income to 
thousands of households, loss of resources to suppliers, loss of supplies in the market for 
consumers, and loss of tax to the government ( Wambugu, 2012). Until date the above companies 
are still struggling to find a footing in the market, as in the process, they lost investor confidence 
and because of their financial distress, they were not able to satisfy customer needs. This is a clear 
example of what can go wrong when the capital structure of any firm is not well managed even in 
a stringent regulated environment. 
This study seeks to focus into the three important factors in which are financial leverage, cost 
capital and agency costs. It seeks to add to the current knowledge body on how these three 
conjointly affect the firm value. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
A number of Kenyan listed companies such as; Uchumi supermarkets, KQ, ARM, Mumias, Trans 
Century, and East African Cable were once considered as lucrative organisations to invest in. They 
are currently struggling to stay afloat (Alushula, 20 18). There are many attributing factors to their 
current state key among them being their capital structure. These companies have massive 
accumulation of debt, which outweighs their resource capabilities. If their current state of financial 
distress is not well addressed, this can lead to bankruptcy and a plausible winding up of these 
companies. The high imbalance in capital structures may mean, companies will not able to fulfill 
their mandate of maximizing shareholders wealth. 
One group of scholars claim that the value of a firm is independent of its cost of capital hence 
capital structure is not in any way relevant to a firm's value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Another 
group of scholars argues that firms have a target debt to equity ratio that maximizes the value of 
the firm, which in turn minimizes costs caused by market imperfections such as agency costs, 
bankruptcy costs and taxes (Wang, 20 13). Empirical studies conducted have no uniform consensus 
between capital structure and firm performance. Molik(2005), Berger and Bonaccorsi(2006) and 
Kyerboach(2007) found in their studies that high gearing increases the value of a firm by reducing 
the agency cost of outside equity. However, Cai and Ghosh, (2003), Bancel and Mittoo, (2004) 
and Booth et al (20 11) found a negative correlation between debt and firm performance, meaning 
high levels of gearing can adversely affect the value of a firm. 
Studies conducted locally by Omete and Isabwa (20 17), and Karuma, et al (20 18) have focused on 
a specific industry, looking at total debt alone in relation to firm value. Makanga, (20 12) and 
(Omollo, et a! (20 18) who looked at various companies in different sectors of the NSE also only 
focused on total debt alone without incorporating any other determinant. None of the studies above 
looked at capital structure and firm value from a sectoral point of view. The literature gap in 
developing countries and the inconsistencies in research results have necessitated this study. The 
study adds to the current body of empirical studies, using a sectoral approach and panel data 
analysis. It will also incorporate cost of capital and agency costs, which are not in focus in prior 
studies conducted. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Main Objective 
To examine the effect of capital structure and agency costs on firm value of non-financial 
companies listed on the Nairobi's Securities Exchange. 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
I. To measure the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE. 
II. To examine the effect of leverage, cost of capital and agency costs on the firm value of 
non-financial companies listed in the NSE. 
III. To assess the managerial perceptions on the relationship between leverage, cost of capital 
and agency costs on the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE. 
1.3.3 Research Questions 
I. What is the measure of firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE? 
II. What is the effect of leverage, cost of capital and agency costs on the firm value of non-
financial companies listed in the NSE? 
III. What are the managerial perceptions on the relationship between leverage, cost of capital 
and agency costs on the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE? 
1.4 Significance of the study 
This study will be of interest to the following: 
1.4.1 Investors 
The main objective of any company is to maximize the wealth of shareholders. The wealth of 
shareholders is directly linked to its value; hence, investors are key which factors affect firm value 
and their significance. This study will help investors understand how capital structure and various 
aspects within it affect their investment in a firm. Financing is very important to the growth and 
continuity of any company. From this study, they will be able to view the value of each company. 
They will also be able to know the significance and impact of each variable. With this knowledge, 




Currently a majority of Kenyan listed companies are grumbling with high debt repayment burden. 
The imbalance in their capital structure has put the companies in a desperate situation some on the 
verge of collapse. In such downfalls of companies, the biggest losers are usually the shareholders. 
When the value of listed companies is shattered because aspects of capital structure are not well 
balanced off, it taints a negative picture to the investment market. This means many investors will 
pull off their finances and potential investors will shun off investing in our market. The study will 
help regulators to know how firm capital structure and its various aspects impact value. I hope that 
with the information from this study, the regulators will formulate policies that will protect the 
welfare of all stakeholders especially that of shareholders. 
1.4.3 Managers 
The results of the study will provide guidance to management as they make financing decisions to 
choose a mix appropriate in line with their current sector. It will enable managers to consider how 
capital structure and aspects within it affect the value of a firm. Through this study, they should be 
able to make informed financing decisions that will give a positive boost to the wealth of 
shareholders. This will ensure that the main objective, which is shareholders wealth maximization, 
is attainable. 
1.4.4 Financiers 
This study will enable lenders to identify red flags so that they do not loan out to companies, 
which are unable to repay their obligations. Financiers can be able to lend from a point of 
knowledge on the value of a company. Through the study, the financiers can be able to gauge the 
ability of a company through its value. I hope through this study financiers will be able to 
understand the significance of long term debt, cost of capital and agency costs on the firm value 
hence be able to exercise prudence as they lend to listed companies. 
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1.4.5 Researchers and Academicians 
The study seeks to contribute to current pool of knowledge available on firm value in relation to 
capital structure. The study will bring in a sectoral approach, with long-term debt being looked at 
from an industrial point of view. The study will also bring in the aspect of cost of capital and 
agency costs, which are not in focus in most studies done locally. The empirical findings from this 
study can be used as a basis for future studies, on the same. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The study was carried out for non-financial listed companies in the NSE. The companies were 
drawn from eight sectors, which are; Agricultural, Automobiles, Commercial and services, 
Construction, Energy and petroleum, Investments, Manufacturing and finally Telecommunication 
and technology. The study was for a five-year period from 2013 to 2017, similar studies by Ogbulu 
(2012), Abdullah (2013) and Mule eta!, (2015) have argued that for this kind of study, a five year 





This chapter seeks to highlight the body of knowledge in the area of study both theoretically and 
empirically. It also shows the conceptual framework, which shows how the various variables 
relate. 
2.2 Theoretical review 
This section looks at the relevant theories in place relating to capital structure and firm value. 
2.2.1 Modigliani and Miller Irrelevancy Theory 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) changed the outlook of capital structure when they stated that the 
value of a firm is independent of its cost of capital hence capital structure is not in any way relevant 
to a a firm's value. They assumption made in the theory is that capital markets are perfect and that 
there are arbitrage opportunities to neutralize capital structure decisions. The theory is impractical 
since in the real world markets are not perfected. In 1963 Modigliani and Miller indroduced tax as 
a way of correcting the earlier theory stating that as interest on debt is tax-deductible the more debt 
a firm uses the lower its tax expense, hence as debt increases the market value ofthe firm increases 
because of the present value of the tax shields. The implication is that the shields balance off the 
effects of the high risk being incurred hence the cost of capital will remain constant (Modigiliani 
& Miller, 1963). 
The study does not lean on the assetions in theory but is relevant to the study as the findings will 
evaluate whether capital structure is relevant to the value of a firm. 
2.2.2 Traditional View Theory 
The traditional view holds that capital structure affects a firm's value hence relevant in determining 
its valuation. This views basis its assumption on the possibility of an optimal capital structure that 
will maximize the total value of a firm through a sensible and meticulous use of debt. This 
conventional approach states that using debt a firm can increase its total value using a lower cost 
of capital, though this will lead to an increase in the required rate of return on equity the increase 
will not counteract the advantage gained by the use of debt, which is a cheaper source of funding 
(Damodaran, 2001); (Hasan & Zaki, 2013). 
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The conventional view has three main stages; Increasing value, optimum value and decreasing 
value. At increasing value, as more debt is added the cost of the cost of equity raises but not enough 
to offset the cheaper cost of debt hence the overall WACC reduces and the value of the firm 
increases. At optimum value, as more debt is added the cost of equity continues to rise and offsets 
the cheaper cost of debt, hence the value of the firm remains constant. At this point, the WACC is 
at its minimum and the value of the firm at its maximum hence an optimal capital structure is 
attained. At decreasing value, if more debt is added the cost of equity rises so high and exceeds 
the cost of debt. At this point, the WACC rises leading to a decrease in the firm's value (Hasan & 
Zaki, 2013). 
This theory makes two assumptions. The first is that the debt ratio decreases by raising new equity 
and retiring debt, conversely the debt ratio goes up by an increase in borrowing and buying back 
stock. The second is that pre-tax operating income is assumed to be unaffected by the firm's 
financing mix and by extension its bond rating (Damodaran, 2001). 
The traditional view supports the existence of an optimal capital structure, which maximizes the 
firm value. At the optimal level, the weighted average cost of capital is at its lowest. This is an 
anchoring theory in the study, as the study follows the lead that firm value is affected by capital 
structure and other factors. This theory asserts that capital structure is relevant to firm value and 
that debt and cost of capital should be within an acceptable range. 
2.2.3 Trade-off Theory 
The trade off theory argues that firms try to balance off present potential costs of financial distress 
by use of interest tax shields. The theory asserts that finacial distress if not checked can led to 
bankruptcy (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). The theory asserts that an optimal capital structure is 
possible at the point when the marginal tax benefits are equal with the present value of financial 
costs of distress. To benefit from maximum debt usage, managers are tasked in determining that 
optimal point where the interest tax shield benefit is the same as the value of financial distress 
(Lewis & Sappington, 1995) . 
When a firm borrows more, financial distress costs such as bankruptcy costs reduces the value of 
the firm putting more pressure for the firm to survive making debt unattractive in the end if not 
well monitored. This indicates that the value of a firm increases by us of high levels of debt up to 
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the point the costs of financial distress offset the benefit of the tax shields because of debt 
(Hawawini & Viallet, 1999) (de Wet, 2006). 
The theory has several main predictions. One of its predtiction is that firms which are profitable 
tend to take on more debt in order to shield its profits from tax (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). 
Though this has been disputed by empirical studies conducted which note that firms which are 
profitable tend to take less debt as they prefer to use the retained earnings (Rajan & Zingales 
(1995); (Booth et al (2011); Chipeta & Mbululu (2013). A second prediction is that firms with 
relatively safe tangible assets are expected to borrow more are they are less exposed to costs of 
financial distress this has been co firmed by Raj an & Zingales, ( 1995) ;Huang & Song, (2006) 
;Ezeoha & Botha, (2012). A third prediction is that firms seek to have an optimal captital structure 
hence tend to have a target debt ratio (Graham & Harvey, 2001). It also states that firm size is 
important as large firms can negotiate for loans on favorable terms compared to smaller firms (De 
Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008). 
This theory is relevant to the study as it also supports a possible existence of a target capital 
structure where the marginal costs and marginal benefits offset. 
2.2.4 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) noted that firms which are owned and managed by the owners, agency 
problems do not arise as they is no separation between control and ownership hence no conflict of 
interest when decisions are being made. When managers act on behalf of owners, ideally, they are 
supposed to act in their best interest but in reality, they lack the incentive to create value for the 
company hence an agency problem arises. They state that their two types of agency costs. One 
type is brought about by the conflict between shareholders and managers. The other type is due to 
conflict arising between shareholders and debt holders. The second type is brought about when 
shareholders authorize the investment in riskier projects than lenders would want them to. It also 
occurs when shareholders pay themselves large sums of dividends rather than retaining cash for 
business operations. 
Grossman and Hart( 1982) States that management has control of financing hence the threat of 
financial distress acts an incentive to make choices that will enhance a firm's financial 
performance. Their argument is that managers operating under equity finance only, lack incentive 
because they is no threat of bankruptcy. They state that debt is good, as it forces management to 
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act in the best interest of the organization as it makes it difficult for resources to be used wastefully. 
This is because of the restrictions which debt financing brings about; hence, managers have no 
choice but to employ resources correctly in order to pay back their obligation. 
This theory is relevant to the study as it anchors on the principal-agent relationship, the costs 
incurred due to this relationship is a focus in the study. 
2.3 Empirical Review 
Looks at what different scholars have found in their studies in relation to the areas of focus in the 
study, this include: firm value, firm value and leverage, firm value and cost of capital, firm value 
and agency costs. 
2.3.1 Firm value and its measures 
In finance, the performance of a company is viewed in a multidimensional way. This is because 
performance can be expressed either financially or operationally. In turn, an organizational 
performance can be measured in terms of profitability, productivity, growth, customer satisfaction, 
demand, returns, and many other relevant variables, which are indicative of how the firm's 
activities are being received by the various stakeholders (Prahalathan, & Ranjany, 2011) ( 
Abubakar , 20 16) . Firm value is an important aspect of a company's financial performance as the 
ultimate goal of any firm is to maximize the augment the wealth of its shareholders ( Gharaibeh & 
Qader, 2017). 
Financial performance is pivotal for any firm as it shows an organization's ability to transform its 
resources into profitable income generating activities, which will be on a going concern basis. 
High performance is the ability of a firm to generate high returns for the level of risk taken by the 
firm. Firms, which report high performance, are those that have been able to strike a trade-off 
between risks and returns (Kester, 2006) (Majumdar, 2009). Luthfiah and Suherman, (20 18) note 
that the financial performance of a company is an important aspect when it comes to firm value. 
This is because high financial performance normally causes high demand for a company's shares 
leading to an increase in its share-selling price 
The value of a firm can be obtained through various ways, which include a company's accounting 
book value or net worth (Ohlson, 1995). This method is not commonly used as the general accepted 
accounting principles and standards (GAAPS) might be at variance with the model hence the value 
outcome will unreasonable from the reality. A second measure is a company's market value of all 
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its outstanding shares. This is the most common methodology for valuing publicly listed 
companies. It is determined by multiplying the number of outstanding shares times the current 
share price. The method is however restricted to companies, which trade their shares in stock 
exchanges (Hong, 20 17). A third measure is the capitalized value of a company's projected future 
cash flows ( Mohamad and Saad, 2012). A fourth measure is the deductive application of human 
judgement using a psychometric scale. The results of this are converted to monetary values. This 
measure is problematic as human judgement is subjective. A fifth is a "company' s net worth 
adjusted for intangible and the idiosyncrasies of accounting rules used in the simulation" Adengba, 
et al, (20 16). 
Other preceding studies have also used profitability measures in gauging a firm's value. The most 
common being Return on assets (ROA) and Return on equity (ROE). ROA represents what 
investors gain arising from the operations ofthe company without the effect of financing. Whence 
ROE represents what shareholders earn on their investment. Studies use profitability measures as 
one of the main objectives of any business entity is to make profits. Profits usually fuel the 
activities of organizations, as profitable firms tend to attract more attention from investors and 
enhance the confidence of current stakeholders (Choi & Wang, 2009); ( Abubakar , 20 16) ; (Omete 
& Isabwa, 2017); (Omollo et al (2018). 
This study seeks to use Tobin's Q (TQ) as its main measure; it represents a firm's actual worth. 
Kaldor (1966) the first to introduce the Tobin's Q measure as the ratio between fixed assets and 
its replacement value. It was latter introduced by Tobin (1969) as a method of assessing firm's fair 
value from an investor's perspective. It has been used consistently in similar studies looking at 
factors , which affect firm value as (market value of equity+ book value ofliabilities)/Total assets. 
A higher q value which is normally q> 1.00 is an indication that a firm is highly valued hence a 
good investment opportunity with potential for growth (Tobin, 1969) ( Lang, et al, (1989). Sauaia 
and Castro (2002) state that TQ as a measure with a futuristic approach. The results of their studies 
indicate that a high TQ is an indication of growth opportunities. Companies with a high TQ tend 
to exhibit better performance compared to companies with a lower TQ. Tobin's Q is a preferred 
measure for firm value as it incorporates to the past events future tendencies such as the market 
value of share prices and the expected implementation of upcoming projects (Sauaia, (200 I). 
21 
Tobin's Q measure is not without any limitation. Dybvig and Warachka (2015) points out that 
underinvestment often inflates TQ across different firms with different intangible assets. They 
offer alternative measures which asses scale efficiency and cost discipline. 
2.3.2 Firm value and leverage 
Bhaird and Lucey (2010), Ukaegbu and Oino (2014) and lhiga (2016) State that high financial 
leverage has a negative effect on the firm value by increasing the risk of the financial distress. 
Hence, firms should be careful on how they take on debt so as not to overburden their capabilities. 
Hawawini and Viallet( 1999) and de Wet (2006) Propose that firm's should adopt an optimal 
capital structure. This is a combination of debt and equity, which maximizes the value of a 
company as a whole. Maximizing the value of a company in turns maximizes the value of the 
ordinary share price leading to shareholders wealth maximization. This in turn reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy and liquidity. 
Contrary results also come in support of firms having high levels of debt has having a significant 
positive impact on firm value. Robert and Kraus (20 13) state that firms, which generate high 
profits, are more likely to fund investment activities by use of debt as they face lower risks of 
financial distress. Sumon and Chen (20 11) notes the reason for this is that, profitability is usually 
a strong indicator that the firm is able the efficiently generate revenue using its current asset base. 
This is contrary to what Titman and Wessels (2009) concluded that profitable firms tend to have 
lower debts as they are able to generate more internally hence do not prefer to take on additional 
risks. 
2.3.3 Firm value and cost of capital 
A company's cost of capital is the minimum overall return; it must gain from its current assets and 
firm's activities in order to maintain the value of its shares. It is determined in the capital markets 
and it relates to the degree of risk with a firm's capital structure, current assets, and new 
investments ( Mohamad & Saad, 2012). A firm's cost of capital is also referred to as the weighted 
average cost of capital (W ACC). This is attributed to Modigliani and Miller(l958) who stated that 
to compute it; the weights of each of the financial component in the capital structure should be 
considered. The value of any company is based on the present value of expected future cash flows 
discounted at the company's W ACC. There is has been a proposal for an optimal capital structure, 
which maximizes the value ofthe firm when WACC is at its lowest (Hawawini & Viallet, 1999); 
(de Wet, 2006). 
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Empirical results vary on the relationship between firm value and cost of capital. Lubes eta! (2008) 
and Swanson(2006) in their studies stated that there is a significant positive association between 
cost of capital and market returns, which represented firm value in their studies. This means cost 
of capital plays a significant and potent role on the value of the firm. On the other side, studies by 
Tashfeen and Liton (20 1 0) and Hussain eta! (20 12) indicate a strong negative correlation between 
cost of capital and market. This means that the cost of capital is an important aspect in firm value. 
Although it has a negative, effect on the value of a firm hence should be carefully dealt with. 
2.3.4 Firm value and agency costs 
The agency problem in turn creates agency costs. This is the cost incurred due to the disagreement 
between shareholders and managers, when shareholders view that management do not act to 
maximize their wealth but for personal interest. Agency costs occur due to asymmetric information 
regarding management activities, the analysis of the performance of management, costs of 
monitoring, cost of rewarding the agents, and costs of execution of policies. Agency costs include 
costs of residual claims, bonding, and monitoring. They are classified as internal expenses under 
operating expenses in the income statement as selling, general, and administrative expenditures 
(Singh & Davidson III, 2003); (Islam & Bhattacharjee, 201 0). 
Shareholders are ever devising ways to reduce agency costs, as it may not be possible to eliminate 
these costs. Some of the ways of reducing this conflict in order to reduce the costs incurred include 
giving managers ownership rights by allowing them to have shares in the company, when 
managers have stake in the company their interests is aligned to that of the shareholders Ang, et 
a!, (2002), Fleming, et a!, (2005) . The role of ownership concentration, shareholders who have a 
large stake in the company often dictate the company's affairs hence ensure decisions being made 
are to the benefit of shareholders Jensen and Meckling ( 1976). 
Chrisman et al(2004) in their study state that agency costs significantly influences the financial 
performance of firms. Xiao (2009) and Baker and Anderson (20 1 0) agree in their studies that the 
high agency costs have a high negative significance to the value of the firm. Meaning high agency 
costs cause a decrease in the firm value. Their studies show that when agency costs are high it 
causes share prices to react unfavorably hence a decrease in share return, which means a low firm 
value (Jensen & Meckling, (1976). 
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The measure of agency costs in this study will be consistent with other similar studies by Ang et 
a! (2002) and Min et a! (20 17) who use operating expense to annual sales ratio (Total operating 
expense/Total annual sales). The ratio is used to measure the efficient handling of operating 
expenses and other related direct costs. 
2.3.5 Size as control variable 
Size is usually considered as a key determinant of capital structure. It is assumed that most large 
firms are diversified hence a reduction of financial distress as risks are more spread out. The 
expected result is that leverage is positively related to size (Titman & Wessels, 1988) (Khasnobis 
& Bhaduri, 2002). Small firms deterred by the high cost of sourcing funds from the equity market 
prefer to use debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Studies, which have reported a negative relationship 
between size and capital structure are often weak as the levels of significance are usually low 
(Kumalija, 2011). This makes size a good moderating variable as it pauses a positive significant 
influence between it and capital structure. Size is commonly measured by using Logs of total assets 
(LnA) and the natural logs of sales (LnS). Logs are used because they smoothens the variations in 
the figure over different periods (Myers & Maj luf, 1984). 
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• Firm value 
• Cost of capital 
• Agency cost ~-----------~/A~-~--------,:> 
I Firm Size 
Control variable 
Table 2. 1 Operationalization of variables 
Variable Measurement Scale of measure 
Firm Value Tobin's Q: Market value of Ratio 
firm's outstanding shares + 
Book value of debt I Book 
value of total assets 
Leverage Long term debt/total assets Ratio 
Cost of capital Weighted Average Cost of Ratio 
Capitai(W ACC) 
Agency cost Operating expense/sales Ratio 
(revenue) 
Size Logs of total assets Ratio 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter explains how the study was conducted by giving insights into the research design, 
target population, data to be considered and how data will be collected and analyzed. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is the focus on how data is gathered, analyzed, and used in a study. This study 
used a positivism research philosophy. This philosophy believes that "reality is stable and can be 
observed and described from an objective viewpoint" (Levin, 1988). Positivism "often involves 
manipulation of reality with variations in only a single independent variable to identify regularities 
in, and to form relationships between the variables. Predictions can be made based on the 
previously observed and explained realities and their inter-relationships. " 
The study decided to use a positivism philosophy as it used quantitative data analyzed through 
statistical tools to explain how the variables relate to each other. 
3.3 Research Design 
This study used descriptive research design. This is consistent with other similar studies that have 
been conducted by Abubakar (20 16), Omollo, et a!, (20 18). Descriptive research design is 
formulated to answer the question: What, Where, When and How (Babbie, 201 0). It will be 
explanatory as the study sought to explain how leverage spread, Cost of capital and agency costs 
affects firm value. 
The study takes on a descriptive approach as it seeks through analysis to observe how the 
independent variables affect the dependent variable without posing any interference or tampering 
with the variables at hand with the aim of achieving a specific result. The nature of the study has 
dictated this form of design. 
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3.4 Population 
The total population for the study was all sectors under the NSE, which are non-financial in nature. 
Banking and insurance industries were excluded from the study because they have different asset 
types and are guided by special regulations which tend to set the target debt/equity ratio is regulated 
(Raj an & Zingales, 1995), (Muema, 20 12) (Phooi, eta! (20 17). Sectors that have been in existence 
for less than five years in the target period of study were excluded. This are; Investment services, 
Real estate investment trust (REITS), and Exchange traded fund . 
Table 3. 1 Population of non-financial quoted firms in the NSE 
Sector Number of firms 
Agricultural 7 
Automobiles and accessories 1 
Commercial and services 12 
Construction and allied 5 
Energy and petroleum 5 
Investment 6 
Manufacturing and allied 9 
Telecommunication and 1 
technology 
Total 46 
The study sample focused on companies in eight sectors which were; Agricultural, Automobiles, 
Commercial and services, Construction, Energy and petroleum, Investments, Manufacturing and 
finally Telecommunication and technology. This comprises of 46 companies as indicated in table 
3.1. In the various sectors only companies that have complete and published audited financial 
reports for the years 2013-2017 were included in the study. 
3.5 Data Collection 
The study used both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was collected for objectives II 
and I. This was be gathered from annual audited financial statements for five years from 2013-
2017. The information gathered from the financial statements include; long term debt, total debt, 
equity, total assets, number of outstanding ordinary shares, revenue and operating expenses. The 
financial statements were sourced out from the Capital markets authority and the companies' 
official websites. The study also used daily stock prices for five years from 2013-2017. The stock 
prices was sourced out from the Nairobi's Securities Exchange. 
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The primary data was collected from questionnaires. The questionnaires were used to collect data 
for objective III on manager's perception. Senior personnel in the finance department were the 
target of these questionnaires. The questionnaires was administered electronically through their 
official email address. Follow up phone calls were made through their official office lines to 
encourage them to participate in the study. 
This study used balanced panel data; hence, firms with a negative book value for equity and other 
crucial missing values were eliminated from the study. This was in line with similar studies such 
as Camara, (20 12) and Phooi, et al, (20 17) who employed this type of data. A balanced panel 
approach was prefered as it reduces the problems of self selection, attrition and non-response often 
associated with an unbalanced approach. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Panel data was appropriate for this study as it involves the combination of time series and cross 
sectional data, given the data was obtained for several companies over a five-year period. 
Secondary and primary data was quantitative in nature. The data was analyzed using Excel, SPSS 
and E-views softwares. 
Obejective 1: 
The study used Tobin's q to measure firm value. If Tobin's q is less than one (TQ<1), the 
company's valuation is low. lfTobin's q equals one (TQ=l), the company's valuation is correct. 
If Tobin's q is greater than one (TQ>1), the company's valuation is high. The study used the 
Total market value+ book vale of debt 
Tobin's formula: TQ = ------------
book value of total debt 
Objective II: 
The panel regression model was as follows: 
Yrl: =Firm value measured by Tobin's Q for the ;1h firm at timet 
PO= Constant term 
p 1 ... P4= Regression Coeficients of variables for the ;111 firm at timet 
p 1 Lew= Leverage for the, ;1h firm at time t 
P2 W ACC;t=Cost of capital, ;1h firm at time t 
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P3Agcit=Agency cost, ith firm at timet 
P4 Sizeit = Size is the control variable given by natural logs of assets for the ith firm at time t 
e= the random error term for firm i in year t 
The breakdown ofthe WACC formula is explained in appendix XI. 
Objective III: 
Primary data was collected for this objective. The quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive 
statistics, weighted average mean and standard deviation was used. 
3. 7 Diagnostic Tests 
The Durbin-Watson d test was employed to test for the presence of autocorrelation. Usually when 
dealing with panel data, the assumption is that the error term of a firm is not correlated with the 
error term of another firm. If correlation per chance is observed in the data, it is known as spatial 
autocorrelation. As a standard rule, if d is two, there is no autocorrelation positive or negative. If 
d is, + 1 it indicates a perfect positive correlation. The closer d is to zero the greater positive serial 
correlation (Gujarati, 2003) . 
The general assumption of linear regression is homoscedasticity. That is the error term has a 
constant variance the opposite of it heteroscedasticity. To test for heteroscedasticity this study 
employed the white's general heteroscedasticity test. The reason for selecting this test was that it 
does not rely on the normality assumption and it is easy to implement. The rule of thumb is that if 
the chi-square value obtained exceeds the critical chi-square value at the chosen level of 
significance the result is that there is heteroscedasticity. If the chi-square does not exceed then 
there is no heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003). 
To test if the normality assumption holds the Jarque-Bera (JB) test of normality was employed in 
this study. The JB tests null hypothesis is that the residuals are normally distributed. The null 
hypothesis is rejected if the p value of the JB is low, that is far apart from zero. If the p value of 
the JB is high, that is close to zero then the null hypothesis holds (Gujarati, 2003). 
3.8 Panel Data Analysis Model 
The Hausman test was employed to determine which panel data regression model to use between 
fixed effect model (FEM) and Random effects model (REM). The null hypothesis underlying the 
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test is that FEM and REM do not differ significantly. If the null hypothesis is rejected it is 
appropriate to use FEM not REM (Gujarati, 2003). 
3.9 Ethical considerations 
The main objective of the study was to examine the effect of capital structure on the firm value of 
non-listed companies. The study was conducted in conformity to ethical standards of research. A 
letter of introduction was used in the process of gathering the primary data. The data collected was 
treated with strict confidentiality and has only been used for the purpose of this study. Data was 
derived from willing participants only. The data gathered will not be shared to other parties. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the study through analysis, presentations, and interpretation of 
the findings in line with the stated objectives. The chapter is subdivided into different sections, 
which are; diagnostic tests, panel model, descriptive results, results on firm value, results on the 
effect of capital structure on firm, results on managerial perceptions regression analysis and the 
comparison of secondary and primary data. 
4.2 Population and Sample 
Twenty two (22) companies were included in the final sample. As shown table in 4.1, 14% from 
the agriculture sector, 5% from automobiles, 18% from commercial and service, 18% construction 
and allied from, 18% from energy and petroleum, 5% from investment, 18% manufacturing and 
allied, 5% telecommunication and technology. 
Table 4. 1 Population and sample representation 
Sectors Number of No. of Proportion 




Agricultural 7 4 14 
Automobiles and accessories 1 1 5 
Commercial and services 12 4 18 
Construction and allied 5 4 18 
Energy and petroleum 5 4 18 
Investment 6 1 5 
Manufacturing and allied 9 4 18 
Telecommunication and 1 1 
technology 5 
Total 46 22 100 
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4.3 Diagnostic tests 
The tests conducted for the study were multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and 
normality. 
4.3.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity tests were conducted before the regression model was run to establish whether 
the independent variables are correlated. The presence of multicollinearity indicates a redundancy 
in the model; hence, some variables have to be dropped for the final estimate to be correct. To test 
conducted were the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and correlation matrix. The results in appendix 
III indicate there is no multicollinearity among the explanatory variables as all the VIF results are 
below 3. According to Gujarati, (2003) a VIF above 3 indicates that there could be an existence of 
multicollinearity and a VIF above 10 is a definite indication of high multicollinearity among 
variables. 
4.3.2 Autocorrelation 
The Durbin-Watson d test was performed be to test for the presence of autocorrelation. As a 
standard rule, if d is two, there is no autocorrelation positive or negative. Babbie, (20 1 0) states that 
when d test is below I and above 3 there is cause for alarm and autocorrelation must be corrected 
before the model is run. The result of the test as indicated in appendix IV shows there is no 
significance correlation between the variables. 
4.3.3 Heteroscedasticity 
To test for heteroscedasticity this study performed the white's general heteroscedasticity test. The 
null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity is rejected ifp values are significant that is less than 0.05. The 
results of the test in appendix v shows there was no heteroscedasticity as the p value is 1.00. 
4.4.4 Normality 
The Jarque-bera normality test was conducted and the test showed that the data was not normal as 
shown in appendix VI. As a rule if the p value is significant (less than 0.05), the null hypothesis 
of normal distribution should be rejected. Other normality tests using the histogram and Q-Q plots 
were also conducted to confirm consistencies of results are shown in appendix VII and VIII 
respectively. Brooks, (2014) States that in the case of non-normality it is best for a study to use 
OLS as the effects are minimized in the model. The low number of observation (22) can explain 
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the non-normality. This low observation is due to the use of a balanced panel data; hence, a number 
of companies were eliminated from the study due incomplete data for the specified study period. 
4.4 Panel data analysis model 
The Hausman test was performed to determine which panel data; regression model to use between 
fixed effect model (FEM) and Random effects model (REM). The result from the tests are a p 
value of 0.0057, which is below the normal significance level of 0.05. This result rejects the null 
hypothesis hence the REM model is not effective for this study. This means the study should 
employ other panel data models such as FEM and Pooled OLS. The study employed Pooled OLS 
as it most effective when the data is not normal (Ger, 20 I7). FEM would have been effective over 
OLS if the study used dummy variables (Mbithi, 20I4). The results for the test are in appendix 
IX. 
4.5 Descriptive results of variables 
Descriptive statistics was computed, as shown in table 4.2 in order to get a better view of both the 
dependent and independent variables used in the model for the study. 
Table 4. 2 Summary of descriptive statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LnTA II 0 12.79 I9 .75 I6.5448 1.81713 
LTD ratio IIO .00 .82 .2113 .19459 
AG ratio I10 .03 l.I4 .2309 .17794 
MV 1I 0 .04 4.93 1.1222 1.37278 
WACC 110 9.44 15.34 10.870I 1.17004 
Valid N 110 
(listwise) 
Author (20 19) 
MV, which is the dependent variable, is the proxy for firm value and it ranges from a minimum of 
0.04 to a maximum of 4.93 with a mean of 1.1222 among all the sampled firms. L TO ratio is the 
proxy for financial leverage ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.82 with a mean of 
33 
0.2113. AG ratio is the proxy of agency costs ranges from a minimum of 0.3 to a maximum of 
1.14 with a mean of0.2309. WACC is the proxy for cost of capital ranges from a minimum of9.44 
to a maximum of 15.34 with a mean of 10.8701. Ln TA is the proxy for control variable size with 
the highest ranges of a minimum of 12.79 and a maximum of 19.7 with the highest mean and 
standard deviation from the sample of 16.54 and 1.82 respectively. 
4.6 Results findings of objective 1: firm value 
This study used Tobin's q to determine the market value of non-financial companies listed in the 
NSE. The interpretation of Tobin's q is; if Tobin's q is less than one (TQ<1), the company's 
valuation is low. lfTobin's q equals one (TQ=l), the company's valuation is correct. IfTobin's q 
is greater than one (TQ> 1 ), the company's valuation is high (Tobin, 1969) ( Lang, et a!, (1989). 
Detailed valuation results of the 22 companies in the eight sectors is displayed in appendix X. 
Table 4.3 shows summary results of the eight sectors in the study. The 22 companies in the study 
have an aggregate mean valuation of 1.12. The telecommunication sector has the highest mean 
valuation of 3.57, which is +2.45 greater than the overall mean valuation, this could be attributed 
to that fact the segment has only company, hence not weighed down by other companies. The 
investment and automobile sectors have the lowest mean valuation of 0.11 and 0.14 respectively; 
this is below the overall aggregate by -1.01 and -0.98 respectively. 
Table 4. 3 Summary of sectoral industry valuation 
Sector Tobin Q industry mean 
Agriculture 1.07 
Automobile 0.14 
Commercial and services 0.94 
Construction and allied 0.79 
Energy and petroleum 0.25 
Investment 0.11 
Manufacturing and allied 2.43 
Telecommunication 3.57 
Overall for all companies 1.12 
Author (20 19) 
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The agricultural sector has an average mean valuation of 1.07, this is -0.05 below the aggregate 
mean valuation. The commercial and services sector has an average mean of valuation of 0.94, 
this is -0.18 below the aggregate mean valuation. The construction and allied sector has an average 
mean of valuation of 0. 79, this is -0.33 below the aggregate mean valuation. 
The energy and petroleum has an average mean of valuation of0.25, which is the third lowest, this 
is -0.87 below the aggregate mean valuation. The manufacturing and allied has an average mean 
of valuation of 2.43 this is the second highest from the study results, this is + 1.31 above the 
aggregate mean valuation. 
4. 7 Results findings of objective II: The effect of leverage, cost of capital and agency costs on 
the firm value. 
The study did a total of nine (9) runs of the model, eight (8) for the individual sectors and one (1) 
that encompassed all companies from the various sectors in the study. MY, which is the dependent 
variable, is the proxy for firm value, LTD ratio is the proxy for long-term debt, AG ratio is the 
proxy of agency costs, WACC is the proxy for cost of capital, and Ln TA is the proxy for control 
variable size. Table 4.4 elaborates the results of the pooled OLS for all the companies. From the 
table all the dependent variables are significant to independent variable, which is firm value. Long-
term debt has the highest positive significance of 15.64, while agency costs and firm value have 
negative significance of -2.35 and -0.34 respectively. Cost of capital is positively significant at 
0.51. 
Table 4. 4 Pooled OLS E-views output 
Dependent Variable: rv1v 
Method : Pooled Least Squares 
Date : 05/05/19 Time: 19: 13 
Sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations : 110 
Cross-sections included: 5 







-2 . 349013 
-0. 340504 
15. 64030 
0 . 512190 
R-squared 0 . 782464 
Adjusted R-squared 0 . 781268 
S . E . of regression 0 .232949 
Sum squared resid 29 .62885 
Log likelihood 22 .90552 
Std. Error 
0 .383073 
0 . 011828 
0 . 385600 
0 . 015199 
t-Statistic 






Akaike info criterion 
Sch..,.•..rarz criterion 
Hannan-Ouinn criter-. 
Pro b . 
0 . 0000 
0 . 0000 
0.0000 
0 . 0000 
1 . 422934 




L-D_u_r_b_in_-_~~ __ a_ts_o_n __ s_ta_t ______ 2_._9_9_7_7_7_2 _________________________________ Author(2019) 
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4.7.1 Agricultural sector 
Table 4.5 shows all the independent variables are significant to independent variable, which is 
firm value. Long-term debt has the highest positive significance of 15.64, while agency costs and 
size have negative significance of -2.35 and -0.34 respectively. Cost of capital is positively 
significant at 0.51. 
Table 4. 5 Agriculture: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable: lv1V 
rv1ethod : Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/03/19 Time: 20:22 
sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations: 15 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 75 
variable coefficient std. Error t - statistic Pro b. 
LTD_RATIO 15. 64030 1 . 069312 14. 62652 0 . 0000 
VVACC 0 . 512190 0 . 042148 12. 15229 0 .0000 
AG_ RATIO - 2 . 349013 1 . 062303 - 2 .211244 0 . 0302 
LN _TA -0. 340504 0 . 032799 -10.38148 0 . 0000 
R-squared 0 . 782464 lv1ean dependent var 1 . 422934 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .773272 S . D . dependentvar 0 . 500985 
S . E . of regression 0 .238549 Akaike info criterion 0 .023374 
Sum squared resid 4 . 040297 Sch\.•;arz cr-iterion 0 . 146973 
Log liKelihood 3 . 123480 Hannan- Ouinn criter_ 0 . 072726 
Durbin-Watson stat 3 . 006614 Author (2019) 
4.7.2 Automobile sector 
Table 4.6 shows all the independent variables are significant, agency costs and size negatively at 
-4.17 and -0.08 respectively. Long-term debt and cost of capital positively significant at 2.89 and 
0.16 respectively. 
Table 4. 6 Automobile: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable : lv1V 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05105119 Time: 11 : 14 
sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations : 5 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistlc Prob. 
AG RATIO - 4 . 166291 1.375849 -3 .028161 0 . 0064 
LN_TA -0. 078051 0 . 020099 - 3 .883304 0 . 0009 
LTD RATIO 2 .894322 0 . 573360 5 .047998 0 . 0001 
WACC - 0 . 158137 0 . 031248 5 . 060731 0 . 0001 
R-squared 0 . 546834 rv1ean dependent var 0 . 138421 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .482096 S . D . dependentvar 0 . 050748 
S . E . of regression 0 .036521 AkaiKe info criterion -3 . 636209 
Sum SQuared res id 0 . 028010 Sch\.varz criterion -3. 441189 
Log liKelihood 49.45261 Hannan-Ouinn criter. -3. 582119 
Durbin-Watson stat 1 . 846397 
Author (20 19) 
4.7.3 Commercial and services sector 
Table 4.7 shows all the independent variables are non-significant to the dependent variable. All 
the variables have a p value above 0.05. Agency costs and size are negatively non-significant with 
36 
coefficients of -4.16 and -0.08 respectively. Debt and WACC are positively non-significant with 
coefficients of2.89 and 0.16 respectively. 
Table 4. 7 Commercial and services: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/05/19 Time: 11 :25 
Sample : 2013 2017 
Included observations : 20 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced} observations: 100 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Pro b . 
AG_ RATIO 0 .034159 0 . 167656 0.203743 0 .8390 
LN _TA 0 . 017261 0 .018631 0 .926456 0 .3565 
LTD_ RATIO 0 .026378 0 .310750 0 .084885 0 .9325 
V•/ACC 0 . 012145 0 .028486 0.426343 0 .6708 -
R-squared 0 . 057220 fvlean dependent var 0 .384091 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .027758 S . D . dependentvar 0 . 065024 
S . E . of regression 0 .064115 Al<aiKe info criterion -2 .617084 
Sum squared resid 0 .394636 Schwarz criterion -2 .512877 
Log liKelihood 134.8542 Hannan-Ouinn criter. -2 .574909 
Durbin-\.Yatson stat 3 . 178045 Author (20 19) 
4.7.4 Construction and allied sector 
Table 4.8 shows all the independent variables are highly significant to the dependent variable. 
Agency costs and cost of capital are negatively significant at -2.9 and -0.77 respectively. Size and 
long-term debt are positively significant at 0.47 and 4.37 respectively. 
Table 4. 8 Construction and allied: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable: r"'V 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/05/19 Time: 11 :44 
Sample : 2013 2017 
Included observations : 20 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 100 
Variable Coefficient Stcl. Error t-Statistic Pro b . 
AG_RATIO -2.896009 0 .047473 -61 .00387 0 . 0000 
LN_TA 0 .474566 0 . 004236 112. 0431 0 . 0000 
LTD_RATIO 4 .372113 0 . 027852 156.9788 0 .0000 
VVACC -0.765336 0 . 006516 -117.4609 0 .0000 -
R-squared 0 .998217 r,.,ean dependent var 0 .744298 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .998161 S.D. dependent var 0 .477682 
S.E. of regression 0 .020483 A.k:aike info criterion -4 .899219 
Sum squared r-esid 0 .040279 Sch ... varz criterion -4.795012 
Log likelihood 248.9610 Hannan-Quinn criter- . -4 .857045 
Durbin-\.IVatson stat 2.736478 Author (20 19) 
4.7.5 Energy and petroleum sector 
Table 4.9 shows apart from long-term debt all other factors are highly significant to firm value. 
Agency costs and cost of capital are positively significant at 1.06 and 0.03. Size is highly 
negatively significant at -0.02. 
37 
• 
Table 4. 9 Energy: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/05/19 Time: 11 :48 
Sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations : 20 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations : 100 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error !-Statistic Pro b . 
AG RATIO 1 .057457 0 . 182330 5.799682 0.0000 
LN _TA -0.021494 0.004947 -4.344962 0 .0000 
LTD_ RATIO -0.038211 0 .036570 -1 .044880 0.2987 
WACC 0 .032233 0 .008869 3 .634416 0 .0004 -
R-squared 0.417398 Mean dependent var 0 .083057 
Adjusted R-squared 0.399192 S .D . dependent var 0.053597 
S .E. of regression 0.041544 Al<aike info criterion -3.484938 
Sum squared resid 0 .165689 Schwarz criterion -3.380731 
Log likelihood 178.2469 Hannan-Ouinn criter. -3.442763 
Durbin-Watson stat 2 .017787 
Author (20 19) 
4.7.6 Investment sector 
Table 4.10 shows long-term debt and cost of capital are highly significant at -0.43 and 0.03 
respectively. The results show that agency costs and size are non-significant to firm value at -0.38 
and -0.001 respectively. 
Table 4. 10 Investment: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable : MV 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05105/19 Time: 12:53 
sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations : 5 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 25 
Val"iable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Pro b . 
AG_RATIO - 0.379575 0 .330608 -1.148111 0 .2638 
LN_TA 0 .001102 0 .009555 0.115345 0 .9093 
LTD_RATIO -0.432931 0 . 135768 -3 .188765 0 .0044 
WACC 0 .025235 0.006413 3.935101 0.0008 -
R-squared 0 .620783 r'w1ean dependent var 0 . 106243 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .566609 S .D . dependentvar 0 .037159 
S . E . of reoression 0 .024463 Akalke info criterion -4 .437675 
Sum squared resld 0 .012567 Sch\varz criterion -4.242655 
Log likelihood 59 .47093 Hannan-Oulnn c.-iter. -4 .383584 
Durbin-Watson stat 1 .230489 Author (20 19) 
4.7.7 Manufacturing and allied sector 
Table 4.11 shows all the independent variables are highly significant to the dependent variable. 
Agency costs, long-term debt, and cost of capital are negatively significant at -162.17, -39.20 and 
-0.55 respectively. Size is positively significant at 1.94. 
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Table 4. 11 Manufacturing and allied: Pooled E-views output 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Method : Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/ 05/19 n me: 12:41 
Sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations : 20 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 100 
Variable Coefficient Std . Error t -Statistic Prob. 
AGENCY_COSTS - RATI -162.1615 5.403263 -30.01176 0 .0000 
LN TA 1 .935951 0 .063451 30.51120 0 .0000 
LTD RATIO -39.20315 2 .138780 -18 .32968 0.0000 
WACC -0 .552731 - 0 . 027942 -19 .78171 0 .0000 
R-squared 0 .916220 Mean dependent var 4.363660 
Adjusted R-squared 0.913602 S.D. dependent var 0 .531796 
S .E . of regression 0 .156314 Al<ail<e info criterion -0.834727 
Sum squared resid 2 .345658 Schwarz crit erion -0.730520 
Log likelihood 45.73635 Hannan-Ouinn criter. - 0 .792553 
Durbin-'Natson stat 3 .354044 Author (20 19) 
4.7.8 Telecommunication sector 
Table 4.12 shows all the independent variables expect debt are highly significant to the dependent 
variable. Agency costs, size, and cost of capital are significant at -146.94, 0.611 , and 1.54 
respectively. 
Table 4. 12 Telecommunication: Pooled E-views results 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/05/19 Time: 12:03 
Sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations: 5 
Cross-sections included: 5 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 25 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Pro b. 
AGENCY _COSTS -146.9427 9.133894 -16.08763 0.0000 
WACC 0.611144 0.073452 8.320341 0.0000 
LN_TA 1.539752 0.104505 14.73380 0.0000 
LONG_ TERM_DEBT _RA Tl 2.595341 1.539343 1.686006 0.1066 
R-squared 0.940290 Mean dependent var 3.571125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.931760 S.D. dependent var 0.987722 
S.E. of regression 0.258020 Akaike info criterion 0.274087 
Sum squared resid 1.398061 Schwarz crtterion 0.469107 
Log likelihood 0.573909 Hannan-Guinn criter. 0.328178 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.831896 Author (20 19) 
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4.7.9 Summary of results 
Table 4.13 below shows summary the output results for all the various sectors. It gives an overall 
summary of which variables were significant for the different sectors in the study. The results show 
a variation across the sectors. This indicate that firm value is affected differently by the three 
factors in the various sectors. 
Table 4. 13 Summary of results 
Sectors Significant variables Non-significant variables 
Agriculture All None 
Automobile All None 
Construction and allied All None 
Manufacturing All None . 
Commercial and services None All 
Energy and petroleum Agency costs Long term debt 
cost of capital 
Investment long-term debt Agency costs 
cost of capital 
Telecommunication Agency costs, long-term debt 
cost of capital 
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4.8 Results findings of objective III: Managerial perceptions on the effect of capital structure 
on firm value. 
4.8.1 Response rate and background information 
A total of22 questionnaires were emailed to the 22 companies that met the balanced panel criteria. 
Out of the 22, 18 giving a response rate of 81 .82%. The bar graph below gives a pictorial summary 
of the response rate in the various sectors. Out of the 18 companies, those listed above 15 years 




Telecommunication and technology 
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~ 
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4.8.2 Leverage and firm value 
On debt and firm value, a majority of the respondents were of the view that excessive use of debt 
will eventually push the firm towards bankruptcy at a weighted mean of 3.84. 61% of the 
respondents were of the view that proper amount of debt will result in a lower overall cost of 
capital leading to a maximum firm value. Most respondents were not of the view that excessive 
debt is what will maximize the value of the firm as indicated by the weighted mean of 1.95. Table 
4.14 below is a summary ofthe results. 
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Table 4. 14 Leverage and firm value 
No. Statements Mean Standard Dev 
1 Excessive debt will maximize firm value 1.95 0.17 
2 Company has a debt limit 3.5 0.29 
3 Proper use of debt maximizes firm value 3.55 0.28 
4 Excessive use of debt will push company to bankruptcy 3.84 0.18 
Respondents (20 19) 
4.8.3 Cost of capital and firm value 
On cost of capital, a majority of the respondents with a mean of 3.33 were of the view that 
companies' uses lower cost of debt to maximize the market value of the firm. Most respondents 
were not of the view that an overall lower cost of capital in the company always an indication that 
the firm value is high as indicated by the mean of2.67. The summary of the results is on table 4.15 
below. 
Table 4. 15 Cost of capital and firm value 
No. Statements Mean Standard Dev 
1 Lower cost of debt maximizes firm value 3.33 0.23 
2 An high cost of capital is an indication of financial 3.19 0.19 
distress 
3 low cost of capital is an indication of a high firm value 2.67 0.14 
4 High cost of equity is an indication that a company is 2.81 0.21 
highly valued 
Respondents (20 19) 
4.8.4 Principal-agent relationship and firm value 
On the principal-agent relationship, a majority of the respondents with a mean of 3.5 were of the 
view that high dividends payout is because the company is has sufficient cash flows to run future 
operations. Most respondents were not of the view that high debt level is a necessary discipline to 
ensure senior management maximizes shareholder value as indicated by the lowest mean of 2.5. 
The overall mean of 3.04 show that from the respondents point of view, principal-agent has a 
significant effect of firm value. The summary ofthe responses is on table 4.16 below. 
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Table 4. 16 Principal-agent relationship and firm value 
No. Statements Mean Standard Dev 
1 High debt level is a necessary discipline to ensure senior 2.5 0.15 
management maximizes shareholder value. 
2 Debt IS used to invest m risky projects for high 3.06 0.17 
shareholder return. 
3 Debt is paid first before dividends. 3.08 0.17 
4 Dividends payout is an indication of sufficient future cash 3.5 0.27 
flows. 
4.9 Comparison of findings from secondary and primary data 
The findings from both secondary and primary data are complimentary as both indicate that 
leverage, cost of capital, and agency costs have an effect on firm value. The results of the secondary 
data show a very high significant effect of the three independent variables on firm value with an 
overall p value of 0.00. Similarly, a majority of respondents agreed that leverage, cost of capital, 
and agency costs have an effect on firm value, with a majority of statements having weighted mean 
of 3 and above. 
4.10 Chapter Summary 
The study used quantitative data gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary 
gathered was analyzed using excel, SPPS and E-views software, and presented in form of tables. 
Balanced panel data was used in the study and the Pooled OLS model was used for the analysis of 
the effect of capital structure on firm value. The overall firm value indicated that the non-financial 
listed companies were a good investment opportunity. The overall result on the effect of capital 
structure on firm value shows that all the variables are significant. The result on managerial 
perspective shows that most respondents agree that capital structure has an effect on firm value. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focusses on discussion of the findings with regard to the objectives of the study. It 
also looks at the conclusion, implications, recommendations, and limitations of the study. Areas 
of further research are also pointed out in the study. 
5.2 Discussion of findings 
The study sought to examine the effect of financial leverage, cost of capital, and agency costs on 
firm value of non-financial companies listed on the Nairobi's Securities Exchange. The study has 
three objectives. The first objective was to measure the value of non-financial companies listed in 
the NSE by use ofTobin's Q. The second objective was to examine the effect of leverage, cost of 
capital and agency costs on the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE. The third 
objective was to assess the managerial perceptions on the relationship between leverage, cost of 
capital and agency costs on the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE. Firm 
value was analyzed using excel, the effect was analyzed using pooled OLS regression analysis, 
using a balanced panel data approach. Questionnaires were distributed to obtain managerial 
perception. 
5.2.1 The measure firm value of non-financial companies listed in NSE 
Firm value was measured using Tobin's Q ratio, the overall aggregate for the 22 companies in the 
study being 1.12. The q ratio figure obtained in the study is not far off from 1.329 obtained in a 
similar study by Mule eta!, (20 15) with a sample of 50 listed companies in the NSE for the period 
2007-2011. When Q ratio is q> 1.00, it is an indication of a high valuation. The result of 1.12 means 
most companies in the sample study are overvalued relative to their book values. The results imply 
that the share prices are highly priced compared to the replacement costs of the assets hence overall 
the non-financial companies are a good investment opportunity. 
The results of the study indicate that telecommunication, manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
are the most lucrative to invest in with q values of 3.57, 2.43 and 1.07 respectively. These sectors 
happen to be the only ones from the sample study with q values above 1.00 and above the overall 
aggregate of 1.12. The high valuation in the telecommunication sector is greatly attributed to fact 
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that it has only one company, which has the largest market share. The company in the segment is 
highly innovative with a myriad of products that meet the needs of customers (Anyanzwa 20 18). 
The high performance in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors can be attributed to 
government policies that have promoted the use oflocally manufactured products. The government 
has also been making economic deals that have opened the market for Kenyan products. The study 
results point investment, automobile and energy sectors to be lowly valued with q values of 0.11 , 
0.14 and 0.25 respectively, this is way below the aggregate value of 1.12 hence these sectors may 
not be very attractive to potential investors. Only one company fitted the conditions of the study, 
if the rest of the companies are fitted in, the figure could differ. The automobile sector is in high 
competition from cheaply imported second hand vehicles and spare parts. The energy sector is 
facing high price regulation from the energy regulation commission. The stated factors can some 
of the plausible causes for the low valuation in these sectors. 
5.2.2 The effect of leverage, cost of capital and agency cost on the firm value of non-financial 
companies listed in NSE 
Balanced panel data regression was used to examine the effect capital structure, cost of capital, 
and agency cost of firm value. The regression model run for all companies in the study indicates 
that all the independent variables are highly significant to firm value with a p value ofO.OO. Long-
term debt ratio is highly positively significant with a coefficient of 15.64; hence, the results infer 
a unit change in long-term debt leads to an increase in Tobin's Q ratio by 15.64. This finding is 
line with studies by Wambugu (2012), Abubakar (2016) and Muigai (2017)) who found a 
significantly high positive effect between debt and firm value. However, previous studies by Mule 
et al , (20 15) have contrary results showing a significantly negative effect. W ACC is positive 
significant with a coefficient 0.51; hence, the results infer a unit change in the W ACC leads to an 
increase in Tobin's Q ratio by 0.51, this corresponds with the results stated by Gharaibeh and 
Qader (20 17) in their study. The result on leverage and cost of capital is opposed to the theory of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) who stated that capital structure has no effect on firm value. The 
results from the study indicate that if debt is well spent by managers selecting high return projects, 
this translates to higher returns for shareholders (Chen & Jiang, (2014); Kannadhasan, eta! (2016). 
Agency cost and size show a result of highly negative significance to firm value. Agency cost has 
a coefficient of -2.35; hence, the results infer a unit change in agency cost leads to a decrease in 
Tobin's Q ratio by 2.35. This means as agency costs increase the firm value decreases hence an 
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inverse relationship. This result are line with empirical studies by Ang et al (2002) and Min et al 
(20 17). Size has a coefficient of -0.34 which infers a unit change in firm size leads to a decrease 
in Tobin ' s Q ratio. This result is in contrast with similar studies by Mule et al, (2015) and Adengba 
et al, (20 16). 
5.2.3 Managerial perceptions on the effect of capital structure on the firm value of non-
financial companies listed in the NSE. 
On leverage, a majority of the respondents were of the view that excessive use of debt will 
eventually push the firm towards bankruptcy; this is line with the tradeoff theory by Kraus and 
Litzenberger, (1973) who urged managers not to take on excess debt to a point of financial distress 
to the firm. This view is supported further by empirical studies by Bhaird and Lucey (20 1 0), 
Ukaegbu and Oino (2014) and lhiga (2016) who stated that high financial leverage has a negative 
effect on the firm value by increasing the risk of the financial distress. 
On cost of capital, a majority of the respondents were of the view that their companies' uses lower 
cost of debt to maximize the market value of the firm. This is line with traditional theory, which 
states that the value of the firm is highest when the W ACC is at its lowest (Damodaran, 2001 ); ( 
Hasan & Zaki, 20 13). This response are line with the findings by Lubos et al (2008) and 
Swanson(2006) in their studies. 
On the agency relationship, most respondents were not of the view that high debt level ts a 
necessary discipline to ensure senior management maximizes shareholder value. This is contrary 
to the thoughts prescribed by the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who assertted that 
debt is a good tool to make managers work for the benefit of shareholders, this sentiment is shared 
by Grossman and Hart( 1982). 
5.3 Conclusion 
The first objective aimed to measure the firm value of non-financial listed firms in the NSE. The 
results of the study show that from an overall perspective, investing in on non-financial listed firms 
is a good investment decision based on the aggregate q value 1.12. Sectors such as 
telecommunication, manufacturing, and agriculture have an aggregate q value above the aggregate 
of all combined. While sectors such as automobile, commercial and services, energy and 
petroleum, construction and allied and investment have an aggregate q value below the total 
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aggregate of companies in the study. This infers that a majority of companies are struggling to 
have a market value that is attractive for future investments. 
The second objective aimed at examining the effect of leverage, cost of capital, and agency cost 
on firm value. The results from all the 22 companies in the study showed that debt and working 
capital have a significant positive effect on firm value in line with the traditional, tradeoff and 
agency theories of capital structure. These theories propagate that increased levels of debt are good 
for the value of any firm , as it also pushes the cost of capital high leading to higher returns for 
shareholders. On the other hand, agency costs together with the moderating variable of size have 
a significant negative effect. The findings on agency costs are line with the agency theory, which 
asserts that an increase in agency costs will lead to a decrease in firm value. The results from the 
individual sectors were not all reflective of the aggregate result of all companies combined. Some 
of the disparities noted were: In the investment and manufacturing sectors, debt has a negative 
significance on firm value. In commercial and services sector none of the variables were significant 
to market value. In construction and allied WACC had a negative significant effect on firm value. 
In energy, debt had a negative non-significant effect on firm value. 
The third objective aimed to get managerial perceptions on the effect of leverage, cost of capital 
and agency costs on the firm value of non-financial companies listed in the NSE. From the 
respondents, debt should be taken up to a level that it does not put a company into financial distress. 
The cost of capital should also be maintained at a low level to ensure the firm value does is affected 
negatively. The respondents were also of the view that debt was not necessary to maximum 
shareholders wealth, but if the company has debt, it should be given precedent over dividend 
payment. 
5.4 Research implications and recommendations 
5.4.1 Investors 
Investors should carefully assess how debt, cost of capital, and agency cost are being managed in 
a firm to ensure maximum value in their investment. Potential investors should be keen on the 
value of the firm before committing their funds because it is an indication of a company's 
performance. They should look at investments in a sectoral way to spread out their risks in sectors 
that have potential for growth and high return based on their firm values. 
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5.4.2 Managers 
The main objective was to examine the effect of debt, cost of capital and agency costs on the firm 
value of non-financial listed companies. Based on the findings and conclusion ofthe study, all the 
three variables significantly affect firm value. Managers should ensure that these three factors 
should be well balanced out to ensure shareholders' wealth is maximized, indicative from the firm 
value. 
5.4.3 Regulatory bodies 
Regulatory bodies should be vigilant to ensure the interests of investors is well protected by 
constantly monitoring the market value of listed companies and ensuring all factors affecting it are 
well balanced for the benefit of all stakeholders. They should develop policies that fit into and are 
relevant to each market segment. 
5.4.4 Financiers 
This study also implies that financiers should be keen, by financing companies that have potential 
for growth through generation of future cash flows as indicated by the firm's value. They should 
exercise a lot of caution when lending to companies that have a low valuation through stringent 
debt covenants to ensure finances are only used for the growth of the company. 
5.4.5 Researchers and Academicians 
The study contributes to the current body of knowledge by bringing in a sectoral approach in 
looking at firm value and capital structure. The study also brings in a new outlook by combining 
three factors debt, cost of capital, and agency costs. Researchers are urged upon to use other 
variables and experiment on more inclusive models to get more conclusive results. 
5.5 Limitations of the study and areas for further research 
The study had several limitations. The study did not archive 100% response rate from the 
questionnaires distributed despite the follow up efforts employed to encourage participants to 
respond. The study eliminated a number of companies from the target population because of the 
balanced panel data approach; this creates an opportunity for future researchers to use other 
methodologies that will widen the scope making their studies more inclusive. The challenge of not 
finding complete sets of annual reports for the study period, made it difficult to include a number 
of companies. Future studies can also focus on non-listed and financial companies, which were 
not considered in this particular study hence also a limitation in the study. Future studies can also 
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consider using fixed effect model when conducting a similar study to check if the results will be 
consistent with what is in this study. 
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Appendix II: Questionnaire 
Dear participant, 
I am a student at Strathmore University pursuing Master of commerce. I am carrying out a research 
on "The Effect of Financial Leverage, Cost of Capital, and Agency Costs on the Firm value 
of Non-Financial Companies Listed on the Nairobi's Securities Exchange". 
Your company has been selected as one of my respondents for this study. I kindly request you to 
take some of your time to fill this questionnaire for purposes of data collection. Your cooperation 
and assistance will be of great value to this study. The responses will be treated in with utmost 
confidentiality and will be used only for academic purpose in the fulfilment of my project. 
Section A: Background information 
1. What is the name of your Company (optional) 
2. Which sector does your company fall into in the NSE? (Kindly tick (..,J) in the spaces provided) 
Agricultural D Automobiles D Commercial and services,D Construction,D 
Energy and petroleum D Investments D Manufacturing D Telecommunication and 
technology D 
3. How long has the company been listed? 
5-10 D 11-15 years D above 15 years D 
4. What is your position in the company? (Kindly tick (..,J) or state in the spaces provided) 
Financial Director (CFO) D 
Financial Manager (Receivables, Treasury, etc.) D 
Any other Senior Position 
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Section B: Capital Structure of the company for the past five years 
1. In the past five years the company has issued (Kindly tick (--J) where appropriate in the 
spaces provided): 
Equity only D Long-term bank loan only D corporate bonds only D 
Convertible debt only D Combination of equity and debt securities D 
Combination of the debt securities only D 
2. When companies are choosing the appropriate amount of debt certain factors are at play, 
from the factors stated below which factors are important to the company. Kindly tick (--J) 
in the spaces provided in the given scale. 
Factors 
The tax advantage of interest 
deductibility 
The debt levels of other 
companies in the industry 
To minimize the weighted 
average cost of capital 
When interest rates are low 
To ensure that upper 
management works hard and 
efficiently 
We issue debt when our 
recent profits are not 
sufficient to fund our 
activities 
The issue of debt gives a 
good ImpressiOn of the 
company than issuing shares 
Rank( l=most important; S=least important) 
2 3 4 5 
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Section C: Value ofthe firm and various aspects 
The section assess how your company firm value is affected by debt, cost of capital, principal-
agent relationship and signaling effect. Kindly tick (--l) in the spaces provided in the given scale. 
1 =To no extent 2= To a small extent 3= To a moderate extent 4=To a great extent 
No. Statements: Leverage and firm value 
Does the company believe that excessive debt is what will maximize the value 
ofthe firm? 
2 The company has a limit to the amount of debt it can use to maintain a certain 
market value. 
3 Does the company believe that use of proper amount of debt will result in a 
lower overall cost of capital leading to a maximum firm value? 
4 Does the company believe that excessive use of debt will eventually pushes the 
firm towards bankruptcy? 
1 =To no extent 2= To a small extent 3= To a moderate extent 4=To a great extent 
No. Statements: Cost of capital and firm value 
The company uses lower cost of debt to maximize the market value of the firm. 
2 In when the company does a high overall cost of capital an indication of 
financial distress. 
3 Does an overall lower cost of capital in the company always an indication that 
the firm value is high? 
4 High cost of equity is an indication that the company is highly valued. 
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2 3 4 
2 3 4 
1 =To no extent 2= To a small extent 3= To a moderate extent 4=To a great extent 
No. Statements: Principal-Agent relationship and firm value 
1 High debt level is a necessary discipline to ensure senior management 
maximizes shareholder value. 
2 The company uses debt to invests in high risk projects to ensure high returns for 
shareholders. 
3 The company engages in low dividend payouts to ensure debt due is paid first. 
4 High dividends payout is because the company is has sufficient cash flows to 
run future operations. 
Thank you for the feedback. 
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LTD ratio .775 
AG ratio .828 
WACC .930 
Source (author) 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Appendix IV: D test 
Dependent Variable: MV 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 05/05/ 19 Time: 19:13 
Sample: 2013 2017 
Included observations: 110 






Total pool (balanced} observations : 550 
Variable Coefficient S1d. Error t-S1atistic 
AG RATIO -2.349013 0 .383073 -6 .132025 
LN_TA - 0.340504 0 .011828 -28.78899 
LTD RATIO 15.64030 0 .385600 40.56094 
WACC 0 .512190 0 .015199 33.69965 -
R-squared 0 .782464 Mean dependent var 
Adjusted R-squared 0 .781268 S .D . dependentvar 
S .E . of regression 0 .232949 Akaike info criterion 
Sum squared resid 29.62885 Schwarz criterion 
Log likelihood 22.90552 Hannan-Ouinn criter. 
Durbin-Watson stat 2 .997772 
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Appendix V: Test for heteroscedasticity 
Panel Period Heteroskedasticity LR Test 
Null h~rpothesis : Residuals are homoskedaslic 
Equation: UNTITLED 
Specification: MV C AG_RATIO LN_TA LTD_RATIO WACC_ 
Value df 
likelihood ratio 1.131302 22 
LR test summary: 
Value df 
Restricted Logl -177.9943 105 
Unrestricted Logl -177.4287 105 
Appendix VI: Jarque-bera normality test 
Series : rvlV 
Sample- 201 3 201 7 




rvl i nimum 









0 . 4999 1 :2. 




Appendix VII: Histogram 
H istogram 
Dependent Vari a ble: MV 




Moan - - S .1 3E-1 6 
Std. O o v . • 0 .991 
N •11 0 
Appendix VIII: Q-Q plot 
Normal P-P Plot: or Regression St:anclarcll:zecl 
Residual 





E O.G = ....., 
-:i: 




Observed Cum Prob 
Appendix IX: Hausman test result. 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: Untitled 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. statistic 
Cross-section random 14.560025 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons : 
Variable Fixed 
AG RATIO -1 . 136071 
LN _TA -0.714544 
LTD RATIO 0 .572652 
Vo/ACC 0.026717 -




-0 . 148523 





0 . 005393 
0 . 057384 
0 . 037422 
0 . 000111 
Company EAAGADS KAKUZI KAPCHORUA 
Year MV MV MV 
2013 1.64 0.84 0.27 
2014 2.09 0.88 0.28 
2015 1.68 1.53 0.26 
2016 0.93 1.35 0.27 
2017 0.77 3.01 0.30 




Pro b . 
0 .0057 























mv mean 0.11 
Commercial and services sector 
Company Express KQ NMG TPS 
Year MV MV MV MV 
2013 0.29 0.15 4.31 0.51 
2014 0.48 0.13 4.15 0.41 
2015 0.36 0.07 2.84 0.29 
2016 0.42 0.04 1.44 0.22 
2017 0.37 0.06 1.93 0.34 




Construction and allied sector 
CROWN 
Company ARM BAMBURI B EAP 
Year MV MV MV MY 
2013 1.50 1.64 0.60 0.32 
2014 1.11 1.23 0.61 0.46 
2015 0.40 1.51 0.84 0.22 
2016 0.42 1.42 0.59 0.12 
2017 0.29 1.43 0.97 0.08 
mv mean 0.74 1.45 0.72 0.24 
mv industry 
0.79 
Energy and petroleum sector 
Company KENGEN KENOL KPLC TOTAL 
Year MV MV MV MV 
2013 0.18 0.49 0.15 0.11 
2014 0.10 0.54 0.12 0.14 
2015 0.06 0.81 0.13 0.09 
2016 0.04 0.91 0.07 0.09 
2017 0.04 0.86 0.05 0.11 
mv mean 0.08 0.72 0.10 0.11 
mv industry 
0.25 
Manufacturing and allied sector 
Company BAT CARBACID EABL MUMIAS 
Year MV MV MV MV 
2013 3.50 2.16 4.38 0.24 
2014 4.93 2.00 3.64 0.19 
2015 4.20 1.46 3.59 0.18 
2016 4.91 1.22 3.56 0.07 
2017 4.27 0.96 3.07 0.07 












mv mean 3.57 
Appendix XI: Cost of Capital 
The cost of capital was computed using the weighted average method as follows; 
Equity ( Debt ) 
WACC = Cost of equity( b . ) + After tax cost of debt . b 
De t + Equlty Equlty + De t 
The inputs of W ACC were; Cost of equity (Ke), Cost of debt (Kd), and Weights of debt and equity. 
The inputs were derived as follows: 
1. Cost of debt; 
This data was obtained from CBK Banking Sector reports as monthly average lending 
rates to corporates. The cost of debt for a firm is a function of the firm's default risk. 
As firms borrow more, their default risk will increase and so will their cost of debt. 
11. Cost of equity; 
This study used the CAPM formula; 
Ke = R1 + Plevered(Rm- R1) 
Where R1 represented Treasury Bonds rate, Rm return NASI and {3 was obtained as follows; p = 
Cov(Rl,Rm) Wh R d h . d 
( ) , ere i represente t e m ustry mean returns. var Rm 
The levered beta will be estimated as a function of the debt to equity ratio of a firm as follows ; 
Plevered = punlevered{1 + (1- t) *Debt/Equity} 
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Appendix XII: Turn it in Report 
The affect of capital structure on tha firm value of non 
financial listed companies 
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